

Annex

I The Causal Process Hypothesis Revisited

- I. Process Hypothesis: Conflicting System References Undermine Impact (sustained)
 - (a) international development cooperation is driven by and oscillates between an outstanding number of different system references (sustained)
 - (b) DC activities and cooperation initiatives are less driven by local needs than by sense-making and rationalities that are created inside the DOs (sustained)
 - (c) DC is increasingly subordinated to foreign/trade policies (sustained, derived during field research)
 - (d) the political and economic systems are the decisive references for development cooperation (sustained)
 - (e) DO employees at partner country level balance donors' national interests and local needs by re-interpreting their goals
 - (f) interorganizational agreements, for example on joint activities, can only barely incorporate the extraordinary complexity from several DC organizations (sustained)
 - *development organizations in their networks define the development agenda and not the partner country (not sustained, ambiguous data)*
 - *system references conflicting within a DO undermine the implementation of activities, such as cooperation initiatives (not sustained, ambiguous data)*

- II. Process Hypothesis: Rigid Decision Programs Constrain Coordination (sustained)
 - (a) the obstacles/transaction costs for joint activities are very high (sustained, derived during field research)
 - (b) commitments to more intense cooperation with other organizations have not been translated into operational practice (sustained)
 - *improvement in DC is undermined by chains of delegation and communication which are longer than anywhere else and partly defective (not sustained, insufficient data)*

- III. Process Hypothesis: DOs Create Narrative for Legitimacy (sustained, modified)
 - (a) the publicly announced objectives of DC do not reflect the real motives behind activities (sustained)
 - (b) the paramount aim of DC organizations' outward communication is to promote their activities to create legitimacy by catering to the expectation of tax payers and other stakeholders (sustained)
 - *self-portrayals of DC organizations do not explicate their underlying motivations, but create a particularly vague narrative (not sustained, insufficient data)*

- *the identity of DC organizations does not give orientation in daily work activities (not sustained, insufficient data)*
 - *DC activities, in this case interorganizational cooperation, primarily serve the purpose of creating legitimacy (not sustained, ambiguous data)*
- IV. Process Hypothesis: Visibility and Accountability limit Compatibility (sustained, derived during field research)
- (a) the most potent organizations, i.e. multilaterals like Worldbank and UN, are particularly qualified to initiate and lead coordination initiatives (sustained, moved from CPH on network cooperation)
 - (b) substantially different budget sizes are less likely to be integrated into a joint activity (sustained, derived during field research)
 - (c) small donors with similar budget size are most likely to engage in joint projects (sustained, derived during field research)
 - (d) UN organizations fulfill a double role, being donor and implementer at the same time, causing conflicts of interests regarding their visibility and the visibility of their financiers (sustained, derived during field research)
 - *an effective cooperation initiative does not include all potential actors (not sustained, insufficient data, moved from CPH on network cooperation)*
- V. Process Hypothesis: Partner Countries Do not Coordinate But Donors Do (sustained, derived during field research)
- (a) partner country governments lack the capacity or will to coordinate donor activities (sustained, derived during field research)
 - (b) DC organizations at partner country level can better understand and deal with the local context and respective coordination activities than their headquarters (sustained, moved from CPH on informality)
 - *partner country officials are not sufficiently fluent in English/French to communicate with DO representatives on eye-level (not sustained, ambiguous data, derived during field research)*
- VI. Process Hypothesis: Quasi-formal Meetings Create Constructive Intersystems (sustained)
- (a) informal or non-official work routines can contribute to the facilitation of effective coordination and cooperation (sustained)
 - (b) intersystems are well suited to facilitate coordination and exchange of information (sustained)
 - (c) to not offend the partner country, intensive coordination among donors is labeled "informal" (sustained, derived during field research)
 - (d) quasi-formal donor coordination meetings, to share information and to arrange for complementarity at the (sub-)sectoral level, are key to aid effectiveness (sustained, derived during field research)
 - (e) a thematic overlap is a necessary condition for the emergence of constructive coordination (sustained, derived during field research)

- (f) complementarity of DC activities is efficient and does not conflict with incompatible regulations and differing donor interests (sustained, derived during field research)
- (g) extraordinary cooperation initiatives depend on the personal engagement of individual persons in boundary position (sustained)
 - *in quasi-formal coordination meetings, new ideas and convictions develop that are re-imported into the organizations (not sustained, insufficient data)*
 - *due to weak formal structures trustful interpersonal relationships are more important than trust in organizations (not sustained, ambiguous data)*

VII. Process Hypothesis: Local Employees are Crucial for Coordination (sustained, derived during field research)

- (a) the local staff functions as the institutional memory of DC organizations (sustained, derived during field research)
- (b) the local staff establishes and maintains relationships with other DOs and government organizations, and is of utmost importance for information gathering and clearance with partners (sustained, derived during field research)
 - *cooperation is effective where intersubjectivity is secured with regard to the expectations in the network (trust), for example through thorough documentation (sustained, moved from CPH on network cooperation)*
- *Process Hypothesis: Network cooperation (falsified)*
 - *cooperation initiatives are networks with mutual expectations of reciprocal exchange (not sustained, insufficient data)*
 - *the emergence of a cooperation network needs organizations which create the necessary preconditions to overcome the threshold of uncertainty by requesting and making an initial contribution (not sustained, insufficient data)*
 - *effective (network) cooperation scales up from small but regular exchanges (falsified)*

II The Causal Process Hypothesis Operationalized

Causal process hypothesis I: Multiple system references

- (a) international development cooperation is driven by and oscillates between an outstanding number of different system references
 - *Falsified if: Answer to A.1 refers to only one system*
- (b) DC activities and cooperation initiatives are less driven by local needs than by sense-making and rationalities that are created inside the DOs
 - *Falsified if: Answer to A.3 does mention relevant partner country influence*
- (c) development organizations in their networks define the development agenda and not the partner country
 - *Falsified if: In answer to A.3, partner country defines development gaps*
- (d) system references conflicting within a DO undermine the implementation of activities, such as cooperation initiatives
 - *Falsified if: No applicable answer to B.2/1st questionnaire only*
- (e) the political system is the predominant reference frame of development cooperation
 - *Falsified if: Answer to A.1 does not predominantly refer to the political system*
- (e1/new) As a consequence of budget constraints, DC focuses more on LDC and is increasingly subordinated to foreign/trade policies
 - *Falsified if: Neither of the arguments is mentioned as response to A.1*
- (e2/new) Facing an exorbitant number of opportunities to help, the political and economic reference frames are decisive of where and how help is provided
 - *Falsified if: Political and economic reasons are not mentioned in response to A.3*
- (f) interorganizational agreements, for example on joint activities, can only barely incorporate the extraordinary complexity from several DC organizations
 - *Falsified if: Answer to B.3 describes standardized/easy arrangements, and if no applicable answer to B.2/1st questionnaire only*

Causal process hypothesis II: Legitimacy

- (a) the publicly announced objectives of DC (cooperation) do not reflect the real motives behind initiatives
 - *Falsified if: Answer to A.2 is yes*
- (b) self-portrayals of DC organizations do not explicate their underlying motivations, but create a particularly vague narrative
 - *Falsified if: Answer to A.2 is yes and response to A.3 suggests relevance of mission statement*

II The Causal Process Hypothesis Operationalized

- (c) the identity of a DC organization does not give orientation in daily work activities
 - *Falsified if: Answer to A.3 argues that mission statement gives orientation in day-to-day work*
- (d) the paramount aim of DC organizations' outward communication is to promote their activities, creating legitimacy by catering to the expectation of tax payers and other stakeholders
 - *Falsified if: Answer to A.2 does not refer to the public/domestic constituencies*
- (e) DC activities, in this case interorganizational cooperation, primarily serve the purpose of creating legitimacy
 - *Falsified if: Answer to B.2 is effectiveness*

Causal process hypothesis III: Network cooperation

- (a) cooperation initiatives are networks with mutual expectations of reciprocal exchange
 - *Falsified if: Answer to C.6/1st questionnaire only and C.7/1st questionnaire only does not state exchange; Answer to C.2 does not mention exchange*
- (b) the emergence of a cooperation network needs organizations which create the necessary preconditions to overcome the threshold of uncertainty by requesting and making an initial contribution
 - *Falsified if: Answer to C.1 does not mention relevance of initial contribution*
- (c) the most potent organization is most likely to initiate the network formation by providing requested goods or services
 - *Falsified if: Answer to C.1 does not refer to potent organizations*
- (c1/new) multilaterals (are more neutral,) have outstanding technical capacity and are thus prone to initiate and cooperation initiatives
 - *Falsified if: Answer to C.1 does not mention multilaterals as being extraordinary actors*
- (d) effective (network) cooperation scales up from small but regular exchanges
 - *Falsified if: Answer to C.6 does not explicate intensifying relations*
- (e) cooperation is effective where intersubjectivity is secured with regard to the expectations in the network (trust), for example through thorough documentation
 - *Falsified if: Answer to C.7 does not refer to the importance of documentation, answer to C.5/1st questionnaire only is no*
- (e1/new) the local staff functions as the "institutional memory" of DC organizations
 - *Falsified if: Answer to C.7 does not highlight the knowledge of the local employees*

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(f) an effective cooperation network does not include all potential actors

- *Falsified if: Answer to D.5 involves all potential organizations*

(f1/new) the local staff establishes and maintains relationships with other DOs and government organizations and is of utmost importance for information gathering and "clearance"

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.7 does not mention the relationships among local employees of different organizations*

Causal process hypothesis IV: Informality

(a) informal or non-official work routines can contribute to the facilitation of effective cooperation

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.3 does only mention formal meetings*

(b) intersystems are well suited to facilitate cooperation, as they allow for an exchange of information which would not be possible otherwise

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.4 is no*

(c) during the exchange of representatives of different organizations, new ideas and convictions develop that impact on the organizations of all involved representatives

- *Falsified if: No impact is mentioned in answer to C.4*

(d) the effectiveness of informal exchange between organization depends strongly on the extraordinary commitment of employees

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.2 does not emphasize the importance of personal engagement*

(e) due to weak formal structures trustful interpersonal relationships are more important than trust in organizations

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.2 emphasizes the role of organizational trust*

Causal process hypothesis V: Decision premises

(a) once decision premises are established, e.g. on cooperation activities with other organizations, sufficient resources need to be devoted to change these

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.5 or E.4 mentions that change initiatives succeeded*

(a1/new) commitments to more intense cooperation with other organizations have not been translated into operational practice

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.5 refers to changes in operative procedures to better account for the international agreements*

II The Causal Process Hypothesis Operationalized

(b) besides articulated claims for more cooperation, the existing organizational culture (non-explicit decision premises) can impede respective initiatives

- *Falsified if: Answer to B.3 does not mention organizational culture and answer to F.1 is no*

(b1/new) account managers in DC organizations are established and improve relationships with other donors substantially

- *Falsified if: Answer to E.4 mentions useless/unsuccessful account managers*

Causal process hypothesis VI/new: Complementarity

(a/new) the resistance/obstacles/transaction costs for fully harmonized/conflated activities proved to be too high

- *Falsified if: Answer to B.1 highlights that full harmonization is efficient*

(b) as intensive collaboration among donors is offensive for the partner country, donor meetings are called "informal" (though they are in effect quite formal)

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.3 refers to "informality" for different reasons*

(c) donors are using in/semi-formal coordination meetings to share information and achieve complementarity at a reasonable cost-benefit relationship

- *Falsified if: Answer to B.1 and C.3 emphasizes that information exchange and complementarity are more reasonable and efficient than joint activities*

(d) formal arrangements (often) emerge from informal discussions (rather than being arranged all formally)

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.1, C.3, C.4 do not mention that formal agreements have resulted from informal discussions*

(e) a thematic overlap is constitutive for the emergence of joint programs/projects, the compatibility of work routines and personal sympathies is also decisive.

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.2 does only refer to the compatibility of processes and sympathy (and not to thematic overlap)*

Causal process hypothesis VII/new: Compatibility

(a) informal connections among DC organizations are relatively likely, whereas informal communication between organizations of different origin is relatively crucial for success

- *Falsified if: Answer to C.3 and E.2 does not mention relevance of personal relations*

(b) DC implementation units in the partner country allow for more informality than donor organization, rendering cooperation with the local context easier

- *Falsified if: Answer to F.2 is no, because of regulations from headquarter*

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(c/new) donors of substantially different sizes cannot meet on eye-level, with the exception of joint projects/programs to which small donors contribute the TA component

- *Falsified if: Answer to E.2 does not mention the relevance of capacity (budget/expertise)*


(e/new) Multilateral organizations are particularly qualified and oriented towards cooperation, but with each other they strongly compete for funds

- *Falsified if: Answer to E.3 does not mention competition between multilaterals*

(d/new) UN organizations fulfill a double role, being donor and implementer at the same time, causing substantial conflicts of interests regarding their visibility and the visibility of their financiers, eventually undermining their capability to cooperate

- *Falsified if: Answer to E.1 does not mention the double role of UN organizations*

III Qualitative Content Analysis: Categories



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	similar reference systems necessary for joint activities
visibility concerns	
	cooperation depends on size, it's all about visibility
	same size = works well
	large DOs do not need to cooperate
	small and small work well together (more impact)
	different sizes = does not work well
	large with small = too much effort and cannot share visibility
	small with large = not enough visibility and influence
	cooperation with multilaterals: it's about visibility and accountability
	multilateral should be first mover
	most potent (size/experts)
	more neutral
	donor/implementer double role causes confusion
	UN conflict of interest, not providing enough visibility
	GIZ
	have more regulations, for accountability to donors
	cooperation with bilaterals is all about visibility and interests
	emerging donors
	organizational culture towards cooperation
	"culture" is decisive
(in)formal meetings create constructive intersystems	
	exchange information about activities
	to plan joint activities
	formal agreements emerge from informal discussions
	thematic overlap is key
	common goals are important
	concrete form of coordination
	co-financing
	basket fund
	to avoid thematic and geographic overlap, i.e. ensure complementarity
	concrete cases of complementarity
	to substitute for lacking government leadership
	no body, secretariat, website etc.
	it is called "informal" to not offend the government
	to exchange country-specific information/resources/access
	to release joint messages to the government
	breakfast/lunch/dinner for informal exchange
rigid decision premises	
	harmonization is too complicated to work
	processes and regulations are not compatible
	different mode of delivery
	different frameworks/indicators

III Qualitative Content Analysis: Categories

		information sharing is not allowed
		transaction costs are too high
		commitments have not been operationalized
creating/faking legitimacy		
	narrative	
		motives are communicated
		motives are not communicated
		mission statement is vague/gives no orientation
	cooperation initiatives only for legitimacy	
		for tax payers/constituencies
	cooperation is needed	
employees make a difference		
	local staff	
		institutional memory
		personal network
		informal contacts to government and partners
	personal engagement is important	
		commitment
		trust
lack of government coordination		
	government does not want to coordinate and unite donors	
		partner country sets the agenda, does not allow interference
	government cannot coordinate	
	government coordinates	
disjuncture of decision programs between headquarters and partner country level		
establishing network cooperation (discarded)		
	<i>different mode of exchange</i>	
		<i>scales up from small but regular exchanges</i>
		<i>most intensive in initial phase</i>
		<i>reciprocal exchange</i>
	<i>importance of documentation</i>	

IV Field Research: Interview Guide

Guidelines:

- Ask open questions: short, unspecific, without answer categories
 - Ask why and how things are done
 - If terms are used as given (e.g. "cooperation", "our goals"), ask for specification
 - Ask why/how other people do things this way, i.e. circular questions
 - Let the interviewee chose what is relevant, i.e. do not "force" a topic
-

Introduction (7 minutes):

- Thank you for taking the time
- Introducing myself, the University of Hamburg, and the GIGA
 - Presenting the context of the research: compare development cooperation activities in Indonesia and Madagascar. Looking at the issue of donor harmonization 10 years after the Paris Declaration. Using organizational theory.
- Timeframe: 90 minutes, if that is feasible?
- General information and advice for the interviewee:
 - As explained: this interview will be recorded and analyzed. However, all information will completely be anonymized and treated confidentially. It will not be possible to make inferences regarding your identity or your organization.
 - Your answers are in the focus of the interview, not the questions. So, I would like to encourage you to answer freely and to contribute whatever you think is relevant.
 - The interview will start with a general part on development cooperation (DC), not focusing on any sector. Following this, we will discuss cooperation and organizational networks in the education/environmental sector, also including an interactive part.
 - The questions are directed at you as a person. So please give your personal opinion and individual thoughts on the questions that will be asked.

#A: Motives of Development Cooperation (4 minutes):

A.1 Could you please describe the motivation behind development cooperation?

- Do you think that other donor organizations have a different motivation?
- Have these motives changed over the last 10 years?
- Where do these motivations come from, who defines them?

A.2 Are these motives publicly communicated?

- *If not:* why not?

A.3 In the day-to-day work, how is decided which activities money is spent on?

- How are the different (e.g. political, economic, as you mentioned before) motivations taken into account in these decisions?
 - o Does the mission statement of your organization give orientation for decisions?
- Is the partner country involved in the decisions?
 - o Who defines "development" gaps?

#B: Motives for cooperation in DC (8 minutes)

Besides these general issues, I am particularly interested in cooperation between donor organizations.

B.1 What do you think, should donors work closely together?

- *If yes:* how should they work together?
- *If no:* why not?

B.2 Could you please elaborate, why donors want to cooperate with each other?

- Did the approach towards donor-cooperation develop over the last 10 years?
 - o Can you describe how and why this changed?

B.3 Does cooperation between donors work, in the education/environmental sector?

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#C: Procedures towards cooperation (18 minutes):

Having talked about cooperation on a rather abstract level, let us now talk about the practical processes of cooperation between donors, based on your personal experience.

C.1 Could you please elaborate how partners for joint activities are selected?

- How does cooperation start?
 - o Who initiates cooperation?
 - What role do multilaterals (development banks) play?
- What role does the government play?
 - o *If none*: why not?

C.2 You personally, what do you think is the basis for close cooperation with other donors?

- *If trust is addressed*: Is that trust connected to certain persons or to certain organizations?

C.3 When you regularly meet persons from other organizations, does this usually happen formally or informally?

- Could you please give an example?
- Why do you call this formal/informal?

C.4 Did in meetings or relationships with persons from other organizations new ideas, convictions or values develop?

- How did these ideas/convictions/values affect change the work in your organization?
- Could you please give an example?

C.5 Are there standardized procedures or guidelines towards cooperation, of when and how to consider cooperation in the process of developing a new project?

- *If yes*: Could you please describe the entire process – and who is involved?
- *If no*: Are there, or were there, initiatives to change that?
 - o Why did they fail?
- Have operative procedures been changed to better allow for joint activities with other organizations?

C.6 How does cooperation with other donors develop/change over the course of time?

C.7 What is the role of the local employees inside your organization?

- How do the local employees contribute to establishing cooperation with other donors?
- Do the local employees contribute to the documentation of past activities?

#D: Ego-centric network map of organizations in the sector (15 minutes):

This map represents the education/environmental sector. The aim is to show the most relevant donors on the map. Not only bilateral donors, but also multilaterals, and NGOs and companies if applicable.

As you are most familiar with your organization's perspective, your organization is at the center of the map. From this perspective we want to map all relevant actors in the sectors.

This will be done by using these post-its. We will do this in three steps:

1. In the first step, we will collect those organizations that your organization is or was in close cooperation with.
2. In a second step, we will collect actors, your organization works with in a form of loose cooperation.
3. And in the last step, we will collect other actors, which are relevant in the sector, but which you are not cooperation with.

D.1I have already noted the organizations in the education sector, which you have mentioned so far. Would you be so kind as to position these post-its on the map?

D.2Starting with the inner circle: Which are the organizations, your organizations closely cooperates with, or cooperated with in the past 3 years?

- What do you understand as close cooperation?

D.3Coming to the second circle: Which are organizations your organization loosely cooperates with, or cooperated with in the past?

D.4Regarding the third circle: Which are other relevant organizations in the sector, you are not cooperating with?

D.5Could you now describe which organizations are closely working together, indicating this connection by drawing lines?

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#E: Inter-organizational and inter-personal relationships in the sector (15 minutes)

E.1 Some organizations are donor and implementer at the same time. How does that affect their approach towards cooperation?

E.2 Which kinds/types of donors are usually working together?

- Why?
- Does the capacity (budget/expertise) of donors make a difference regarding potential cooperation partners?

E.3 Are multilaterals rather competing or cooperating with each other?

E.4 How are relationships with other actors managed?

- Is somebody particularly responsible for this relationship management?
 - o What does this person exactly do?
 - Does he/she translate discussions/terms from other organizations?
 - o When is this person involved in the process?

[#F: Additional questions, only if sufficient interview time is left (5 minutes)]

F.1 Does the understanding of certain concepts/terms differ between organizations?

- Could you give an example?
- How does this impact on cooperation?

F.2 When thinking of an example from your own experience, to what extent was it necessary to leave the formal process inside your organization to facilitate cooperation?

- *If yes:* What had to be done?

F.3 How are discussions with government representatives affected by the choice of language?]

#G: Closing part (7 minutes):

G.1 Having talked about cooperation in greater detail, did any actor or project come to your mind which you would like to add on the network map?

G.2 Please let me summarize, now that we have talked about the motives behind DC in general, the motives behind cooperation in DC, practical aspects of cooperation, and relationships in the sector, is there anything else, which has not been mentioned yet, which you would like to contribute?

G.3 Again, I'd like to thank you very much for all the insights and the valuable contributions. What do you think, who should I talk to next? Can you think of any persons that would be particularly relevant interview partners for me?

V Field Research: Consent Form

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Consent for Participation in Research Interview

1. I agree to participate in a research project led by Michael Strautmänn from the University of Hamburg and the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. The purpose of this document is to specify the terms of my participation in the project through being interviewed.
2. I have been given sufficient information about this research project. The purpose of my participation as an interviewee in this project has been explained to me and is clear.
3. My participation as an interviewee in this project is voluntary. There is no explicit or implicit coercion or compensation for participation.
4. Participation involves being interviewed by a researcher from the German Institute of Global and Area Studies. The interview will last approximately 60-90 minutes.
5. I allow the researcher to audiotape the interview to accurately store the information I provide. The audiotape will be used for transcription purposes only. I also allow the interviewer to take notes during the interview.
6. I have been given the explicit guarantees that, if I wish so, the researcher will not identify me by name or function in any reports using information obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. All subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies.
7. I have the right not to answer any of the questions. It is clear to me that I am at any point of time fully entitled to withdraw from the interview.
8. I have read and understood the points and statements of this form. I have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.
9. I have been given a copy of this consent form co-signed by the interviewer.

Researcher's Signature

Date

Participant's Signature

Date

VI Case Selection: Data

Partner country	Total ODA in m USD (disbursed at country level)	Indicator 2a: Reliable public financial management	Indicator 2b: Reliable procurement	Indicator 3: Aid flows aligned on national priorities
Dominican Republic	393.8		0%	100.0%
Rwanda	1,095.6	60%	60%	71.2%
Tanzania	2,762.7	50%	60%	100.0%
Uganda	1,503.6	50%	60%	100.0%
Indonesia	6,436.4	50%**	40%	100.0%
Malawi	941.7	40%	40%	90.4%
Moldova	448.5	60%	40%	100.0%
Ethiopia	3,228.1	50%	0%	48.2%
Viet Nam	3,976.9	60%	40%	88.1%
Ghana	1,489.4	50%	40%	92.9%
Philippines	1,899.2		40%	25.7%
Morocco	1,550.9		0%	98.1%
Senegal	681.2	50%	60%	66.6%
Samoa	179.9	50%	0%	100.0%
South Africa	1,221.8		0%	0.0%
Burkina Faso	973.8	70%	0%	83.9%
Pakistan	2,944.4	50%	0%	60.3%
Mozambique	1,853.8	60%	0%	90.2%
Peru	1,054.6		0%	78.8%
Kenya	1,025.0	50%	0%	100.0%
Zambia	882.0	50%	40%	52.3%
Armenia	366.5	70%	0%	84.0%
Honduras	821.2	50%	0%	43.6%
Vanuatu	114.3	60%	0%	53.6%
Lesotho	295.1	50%	0%	100.0%
Benin	658.0	50%	0%	43.4%
Egypt	1,823.9		0%	23.9%
Bangladesh	2,136.7	40%	0%	99.5%
Cape Verde	343.5	60%	0%	51.4%
Nepal	874.9	30%	0%	97.9%
Sierra Leone	450.5	50%	60%*	52.1%
Cambodia	884.5	50%	40%	100.0%
Laos	425.6	50%	40%*	87.6%
West Bank & Gaza Strip	1,588.9		0%	

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Partner country	Total ODA in m USD (disbursed at country level)	Indicator 2a: Reliable public financial management	Indicator 2b: Reliable procurement	Indicator 3: Aid flows aligned on national priorities
Botswana	71.7		0%	100.0%
Togo	145.6	40%	0%	89.1%
Ecuador	183.0		0%	97.9%
Tajikistan	387.2	50%	0%	50.3%
Mauritania	284.2	40%	0%	57,4%*
Jordan	582.6		0%	60.3%
Niger	510.6	50%	60%*	84.9%
Haiti	1,663.9	40%	0%	22.3%
Solomon Islands	202.7	30%	0%	20.8%
Bolivia	708.1	50%	0%	100.0%
Colombia	669.8		0%	80.0%
Cameroon	431.2	40%	60%*	84.0%
Tonga	54.2	50%	0%	100.0%
Congo Dem. Rep. (Zaire)	1,644.3	30%	0%	100.0%
Burundi	595.2	40%	0%	51.7%
Mali	1,092.9	50%	0%	66.2%
Albania	371.6	60%**	40%	85.8%
Gabon	134.6		0%	91.8%
Jamaica	1,013.2		0%	0.0%
Sao Tome & Principe	43.4	40%	0%	100.0%
Namibia	198.6		40%	42.8%
Nigeria	2,101.1	40%	0%	6,3%*
Timor-Leste	341.3	40%	0%	81.8%
Guatemala	246.6		0%	34.6%
Afghanistan	5,807.4	50%	40%*	27.3%
Swaziland	132.0		0%	
Papua New Guinea	598.9	40%	0%	100.0%
Mongolia	357.3	60%	40%*	19.1%
Chad	245.8	20%	0%	43.3%
Kyrgyz Republic	370.5	50%	0%	24.4%
Guinea-Bissau	132.4	30%	0%	39.5%
Liberia	402.4	30%	0%	5.4%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	357.6	50%	0%	0.0%

Partner country	Total ODA in m USD (disbursed at country level)	Indicator 2a: Reliable public financial management	Indicator 2b: Reliable procurement	Indicator 3: Aid flows aligned on national priorities
Fiji	66.3		0%	95.1%
Gambia	97.0	50%	0%	33.1%
Madagascar	442.2	30%	0%	45.8%
Kosovo	381.1	60%	60%	35.4%
Comoros	57.0	20%	0%	100.0%
El Salvador	430.9		0%	3.9%
Sudan	1,293.0	20%	0%	35.0%
Ukraine	566.0		0%	47.2%
Central African Rep.	180.0	40%	0%	0.3%
St. Vincent & Grenadines	4.5	50%	0%	88.6%
South Sudan	575.6		0%	

Table A1: Paris Declaration indicators 2 to 3, adapted from the data of the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration (OECD 2011b), data collected in 2011 (* data from 2007, ** data from 2005).

Source: Author's table.

Annex

Partner country	Indicator 4: Coordinated technical support	Indicator 5a: Use of country public financial management systems	Indicator 5b: Use of country procurement systems	Indicator 6: 500 m USD per Parallel Implementation Unit
Dominican Republic	89.0%	71.6%	72.5%	0.26
Rwanda	91.5%	50.0%	63.7%	0.08
Tanzania	26.1%	79.1%	72.0%	0.31
Uganda	76.0%	65.9%	43.2%	0.20
Indonesia	68.0%	86.3%	69.7%	0.22
Malawi	65.9%	66.4%	61.5%	0.07
Moldova	70.6%	70.1%	70.9%	0.05
Ethiopia	86.2%	69.4%	55.0%	0.13
Viet Nam	59.0%	61.9%	65.6%	0.44
Ghana	59.5%	60.5%	56.0%	0.60
Philippines	97.8%	72.3%	63.8%	0.42
Morocco	82.3%	85.8%	74.2%	0.21
Senegal	79.8%	28.8%	38.4%	0.12
Samoa	76.8%	48.7%	51.3%	0.04
South Africa	87.8%	25.2%	30.1%	0.11
Burkina Faso	48.5%	53.0%	60.4%	0.04
Pakistan	80.1%	74.5%	27.6%	0.18
Mozambique	28.4%	46.9%	56.0%	0.74
Peru	75.7%	72.6%	69.4%	0.05
Kenya	42.2%	58.1%	37.9%	0.14
Zambia	79.2%	51.5%	54.1%	0.06
Armenia	50.7%	43.2%	21.3%	0.15
Honduras	69.9%	30.0%	21.5%	0.03
Vanuatu	60.0%	31.3%	28.8%	0.03
Lesotho	89.3%	38.5%	41.9%	0.05
Benin	81.8%	29.0%	39.9%	0.02
Egypt	77.9%	49.0%	56.2%	0.23
Bangladesh	54.4%	65.0%	29.1%	0.24
Cape Verde	39.7%	29.0%	79.0%	0.07
Nepal	47.6%	62.3%	34.5%	0.03
Sierra Leone	73.0%	36.8%	21.4%	0.30
Cambodia	27.5%	20.9%	23.7%	0.03
Laos	73.6%	40.7%	38.1%	0.04
West Bank & Gaza Strip	80.0%	36.9%	51.3%	0.12
Botswana	83.8%	65.3%	53.2%	0.14
Togo	59.9%	54.2%	47.0%	0.03
Ecuador	54.5%	23.9%	50.9%	0.01

Partner country	Indicator 4: Coordinated technical support	Indicator 5a: Use of country public financial management systems	Indicator 5b: Use of country procurement systems	Indicator 6: 500 m USD per Parallel Implementation Unit
Tajikistan	82.9%	30.8%	30.5%	0.05
Mauritania	71.8%	30.7%	33.8%	0.01
Jordan	94.3%	71.4%	81.9%	0.01
Niger	55.4%	29.2%	23.1%	0.02
Haiti	81.9%	53.8%	37.2%	0.04
Solomon Islands	86.2%	34.9%	35.8%	0.02
Bolivia	52.6%	33.3%	39.0%	0.04
Colombia	90.0%	7.4%	3.9%	0.03
Cameroon	65.5%	11.1%	22.7%	0.04
Tonga	37.3%	37.1%	36.4%	0.05
Congo Dem. Rep. (Zaire)	33.9%	12.6%	9.2%	0.04
Burundi	53.4%	23.3%	30.7%	0.01
Mali	61.8%	32.2%	36.5%	0.03
Albania	58.2%	11.4%	10.1%	0.04
Gabon	53.4%	31.5%	30.1%	0.13
Jamaica	85.3%	11.6%	10.7%	0.25
Sao Tome & Principe	54.1%	7.1%	42.8%	0.02
Namibia	81.5%	9.0%	13.9%	0.01
Nigeria	39.8%	32.9%	35.9%	0.21
Timor-Leste	49.7%	17.6%	14.4%	0.03
Guatemala	68.3%	25.8%	30.9%	0.04
Afghanistan	23.8%	25.5%	11.2%	0.41
Swaziland	78.4%	4.1%	11.8%	0.09
Papua New Guinea	63.8%	23.2%	30.1%	0.05
Mongolia	81.1%	26.6%	20.5%	0.01
Chad	82.8%	6.6%	5.4%	0.10
Kyrgyz Republic	80.8%	31.7%	27.8%	0.01
Guinea-Bissau	47.9%	14.9%	8.1%	0.03
Liberia	96.1%	42.0%	32.5%	0.20
Bosnia-Herzegovina	77.1%	50.4%	44.9%	0.01
Fiji	52.3%	44.9%	7.1%	0.02
Gambia	49.8%	11.9%	32.8%	0.01

Annex

Partner country	Indicator 4: Coordinated technical support	Indicator 5a: Use of country public financial management systems	Indicator 5b: Use of country procurement systems	Indicator 6: 500 m USD per Parallel Implementation Unit
Madagascar	77.3%	12.4%	13.4%	0.02
Kosovo	5.1%	20.0%	20.4%	0.03
Comoros	43.2%	15.5%	30.1%	0.00
El Salvador	31.5%	27.8%	28.1%	0.01
Sudan	58.5%	14.0%	7.7%	0.02
Ukraine	26.1%	26.9%	20.3%	0.01
Central African Rep.	33.6%	28.8%	28.8%	0.04
St. Vincent & Grenadines	97.4%	3.1%	0.0%	0.01
South Sudan	12.6%	8.8%	0.0%	0.01

Table A2: Paris Declaration indicators 4 to 6, adapted from the data of the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration (OECD 2011b), data collected in 2011 (* data from 2007, ** data from 2005).

Source: Author's table.

Partner country	Indicator 7: Aid disbursed as predicted	Indicator 9: Use of common arrangements or procedures	Indicator 10a: Shared field missions	Indicator 10b: Shared country analytic work
Dominican Republic	64.1%	59.6%	65.2%	78.5%
Rwanda	74.4%	66.8%	43.9%	81.7%
Tanzania	97.3%	59.8%	40.6%	63.5%
Uganda	73.9%	48.7%	36.2%	75.0%
Indonesia	76.9%	61.2%	26.3%	55.9%
Malawi	95.9%	51.1%	34.5%	68.4%
Moldova	81.2%	51.2%	35.8%	50.6%
Ethiopia	86.3%	61.0%	38.1%	69.9%
Viet Nam	84.3%	61.6%	16.8%	54.2%
Ghana	67.0%	56.9%	23.4%	55.8%
Philippines	26.4%	53.4%	27.9%	75.5%
Morocco	78.6%	59.1%	19.5%	44.3%
Senegal	62.2%	42.5%	38.1%	72.3%
Samoa	84.5%	59.1%	23.4%	61.5%
South Africa	93.0%	61.2%	79.9%	52.0%
Burkina Faso	75.3%	49.7%	27.2%	63.6%
Pakistan	86.0%	31.2%	26.3%	79.9%
Mozambique	84.0%	50.6%	23.0%	47.1%
Peru	80.0%	32.9%	29.4%	58.0%
Kenya	45.0%	36.4%	42.5%	74.5%
Zambia	0.0%	44.8%	41.0%	66.1%
Armenia	79.7%	50.8%	15.2%	73.9%
Honduras	75.0%	43.9%	45.7%	68.9%
Vanuatu	89.2%	27.2%	35.6%	79.4%
Lesotho	25.4%	42.9%	18.3%	71.8%
Benin	18.3%	49.7%	29.7%	81.1%
Egypt	68.7%	49.2%	31.1%	51.0%
Bangladesh	84.0%	33.6%	28.5%	47.0%
Cape Verde	55.2%	32.6%	32.5%	64.6%
Nepal	54.6%	30.8%	32.6%	63.3%
Sierra Leone	57.9%	34.2%	21.2%	45.8%
Cambodia	90.4%	34.7%	28.7%	46.2%
Laos	50.3%	17.8%	26.3%	52.8%
West Bank & Gaza Strip	93.8%	57.4%	7.6%	37.5%
Botswana	0.0%	12.4%	7.9%	82.1%
Togo	46.0%	35.3%	17.8%	57.5%
Ecuador	89.7%	15.4%	29.8%	55.3%
Tajikistan	91.1%	7.9%	33.8%	67.0%

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Partner country	Indicator 7: Aid disbursed as predicted	Indicator 9: Use of common arrangements or procedures	Indicator 10a: Shared field missions	Indicator 10b: Shared country analytic work
Mauritania	52.1%	26.7%	34.9%	67.2%
Jordan	47.2%	38.6%	16.7%	26.3%
Niger	72.4%	41.5%	4.2%	44.7%
Haiti	43.8%	34.8%	27.9%	61.6%
Solomon Islands	27.3%	39.1%	26.8%	71.7%
Bolivia	42.2%	41.1%	20.7%	42.0%
Colombia	86.1%	13.3%	39.3%	55.4%
Cameroon	36.2%	28.3%	18.1%	53.6%
Tonga	77.0%	40.4%	24.7%	21.2%
Congo Dem. Rep. (Zaire)	58.8%	36.8%	33.9%	47.5%
Burundi	48.1%	48.8%	20.9%	43.9%
Mali	33.6%	44.3%	16.7%	39.6%
Albania	55.8%	22.0%	27.1%	34.3%
Gabon	28.1%	17.8%	17.7%	60.9%
Jamaica	0.0%	90.9%	24.5%	30.4%
Sao Tome & Principe	71.4%	17.4%	20.5%	43.8%
Namibia	0.0%	14.2%	25.4%	79.7%
Nigeria	92.1%	46.9%	16.4%	34.5%
Timor-Leste	2.9%	24.3%	24.0%	62.5%
Guatemala	29.1%	4.4%	68.6%	30.2%
Afghanistan	23.4%	36.9%	9.2%	46.5%
Swaziland	94.3%	25.5%	27.8%	31.0%
Papua New Guinea	34.6%	28.6%	20.5%	20.4%
Mongolia	30.4%	32.0%	14.9%	28.0%
Chad	84.3%	10.7%	19.1%	54.8%
Kyrgyz Republic	44.3%	21.0%	30.9%	28.7%
Guinea-Bissau	22.1%	30.9%	26.2%	58.0%
Liberia	2.1%	12.0%	19.2%	57.7%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.0%	35.2%	16.0%	38.9%
Fiji	4.5%	5.1%	32.6%	43.9%
Gambia	7.8%	12.1%	11.7%	72.1%
Madagascar	58.9%	8.9%	11.4%	38.8%
Kosovo	18.6%	12.6%	10.3%	41.0%

Partner country	Indicator 7: Aid disbursed as predicted	Indicator 9: Use of common arrangements or procedures	Indicator 10a: Shared field missions	Indicator 10b: Shared country analytic work
Comoros	11.0%	18.8%	14.4%	26.3%
El Salvador	22.0%	21.5%	18.6%	52.5%
Sudan	36.2%	1.4%	18.9%	50.0%
Ukraine	43.0%	9.6%	12.8%	35.5%
Central African Rep.	0.4%	0.0%	40.7%	34.5%
St. Vincent & Grenadines	0.0%	0.5%	4.8%	0.0%
South Sudan		0.0%	7.6%	23.4%

Table A3: Paris Declaration indicators 7 to 10b, adapted from the data of the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration (OECD 2011b), data collected in 2011 (* data from 2007, ** data from 2005).

Source: Author's table.

Annex

Partner country	Alignment Index	Harmonization Index	Inter-organizational Cooperation Index (ICI)	ODA, Total Gross Disbursements 2013, in m USD (all donors)***
Dominican Republic	60.5%	67.8%	64.1%	212.0
Rwanda	59.9%	64.1%	62.0%	1101.6
Tanzania	64.4%	54.6%	59.5%	3653.7
Uganda	61.1%	53.3%	57.2%	1851.4
Indonesia	64.1%	47.8%	56.0%	2430.4
Malawi	58.4%	51.3%	54.9%	1169.4
Moldova	62.2%	45.9%	54.1%	410.9
Ethiopia	51.0%	56.3%	53.7%	3903.2
Viet Nam	62.9%	44.2%	53.5%	4757.6
Ghana	60.7%	45.4%	53.0%	1417.3
Philippines	52.6%	52.3%	52.4%	1048.3
Morocco	62.8%	41.0%	51.9%	2541.1
Senegal	49.8%	51.0%	50.4%	1052.6
Samoa	51.9%	48.0%	50.0%	127.1
South Africa	35.3%	64.4%	49.8%	1454.8
Burkina Faso	49.4%	46.8%	48.1%	1093.9
Pakistan	49.6%	45.8%	47.7%	2991.6
Mozambique	55.0%	40.2%	47.6%	2442.3
Peru	54.5%	40.1%	47.3%	532.1
Kenya	43.4%	51.1%	47.2%	3556.8
Zambia	41.6%	50.6%	46.1%	1195.7
Armenia	45.4%	46.6%	46.0%	345.9
Honduras	36.7%	52.8%	44.8%	662.9
Vanuatu	40.7%	47.4%	44.0%	94.4
Lesotho	43.7%	44.3%	44.0%	346.5
Benin	33.1%	53.5%	43.3%	678.7
Egypt	42.6%	43.8%	43.2%	6437.5
Bangladesh	49.5%	36.4%	42.9%	3465.1
Cape Verde	40.2%	43.3%	41.7%	268.3
Nepal	41.2%	42.2%	41.7%	1040.2
Sierra Leone	47.6%	33.7%	40.7%	533.2
Cambodia	44.4%	36.5%	40.4%	869.4
Laos	48.0%	32.3%	40.2%	498.4
West Bank & Gaza Strip	45.6%	34.2%	39.9%	2613.4
Botswana	45.2%	34.1%	39.7%	126.8
Togo	42.4%	36.9%	39.7%	227.6
Ecuador	45.4%	33.5%	39.5%	228.1
Tajikistan	42.6%	36.2%	39.4%	404.8

Partner country	Alignment Index	Harmonization Index	Inter-organizational Cooperation Index (ICI)	ODA, Total Gross Disbursements 2013, in m USD (all donors)***
Mauritania	35.8%	42.9%	39.4%	339.4
Jordan	50.9%	27.2%	39.0%	1662.0
Niger	47.1%	30.1%	38.6%	804.8
Haiti	35.3%	41.5%	38.4%	1181.6
Solomon Islands	29.7%	45.9%	37.8%	293.1
Bolivia	40.1%	34.6%	37.4%	729.7
Colombia	38.6%	36.0%	37.3%	899.0
Cameroon	40.5%	33.3%	36.9%	777.8
Tonga	42.9%	28.8%	35.8%	82.9
Congo Dem. Rep. (Zaire)	31.1%	39.4%	35.2%	2615.3
Burundi	31.1%	37.9%	34.5%	567.3
Mali	35.4%	33.5%	34.5%	1444.2
Albania	40.7%	27.8%	34.2%	359.9
Gabon	35.5%	32.1%	33.8%	106.3
Jamaica	19.0%	48.6%	33.8%	153.0
Sao Tome & Principe	39.6%	27.2%	33.4%	54.3
Namibia	26.9%	39.8%	33.3%	304.5
Nigeria	33.5%	32.6%	33.0%	2685.7
Timor-Leste	26.2%	36.9%	31.6%	258.1
Guatemala	27.5%	34.4%	31.0%	544.8
Afghanistan	30.3%	30.8%	30.6%	5296.5
Swaziland	32.9%	28.1%	30.5%	127.9
Papua New Guinea	37.1%	23.2%	30.1%	700.9
Mongolia	34.9%	25.0%	29.9%	488.2
Chad	31.5%	28.2%	29.9%	456.2
Kyrgyz Republic	32.5%	26.9%	29.7%	595.9
Guinea-Bissau	20.7%	38.3%	29.5%	107.1
Liberia	28.5%	29.6%	29.1%	538.2
Bosnia-Herzegovina	28.0%	30.0%	29.0%	633.7
Fiji	29.4%	27.2%	28.3%	92.2
Gambia	23.3%	31.9%	27.6%	122.4
Madagascar	29.9%	19.7%	24.8%	680.0
Kosovo	27.8%	21.3%	24.5%	535.1

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Partner country	Alignment Index	Harmonization Index	Inter-organizational Cooperation Index (ICI)	ODA, Total Gross Disbursements 2013, in m USD (all donors)***
Comoros	27.5%	19.8%	23.7%	180.7
El Salvador	16.4%	30.9%	23.6%	234.2
Sudan	21.7%	23.4%	22.6%	1214.5
Ukraine	23.5%	19.3%	21.4%	805.1
Central African Rep.	17.0%	25.1%	21.0%	198.6
St. Vincent & Grenadines	30.0%	1.8%	15.9%	13.1
South Sudan	4.5%	10.3%	7.4%	1450.1

Table A4: The Alignment Index, the Harmonization Index, and the ICI (based on data from tables A1 to A3) and ODA disbursements (OECD 2013).

Source: Author's table.

VII Current State of Research: Questions Clustered

- **How do different frames of reference conflict on different levels and affect DC organizations' behavior towards cooperation?**
 - how and why do the strategic goals of donor organizations differ and how does this affect cooperation?
 - what are DOs' (primary) external audiences - and how do they affect the processes, goals, and interorganizational cooperation of DOs?
 - are coordination and cooperation initiatives pursued for tangible results, such as efficiency gains, or to please the environment, i.e. to gain legitimacy?
 - to what extent are DC organizations able and willing to communicate their authentic/"real" intentions in the face of differing frames of references?
 - whether goals and reference frames are congruent on the different organizational levels?
 - how DO behavior on the strategic and operational level affect each other?
 - how does the multi-level context impact on coherence and cooperation initiatives in partner countries?
 - are isomorphic tendencies particularly strong in DC, converging processes and goals more, thus enabling intensive interorganizational cooperation?
- **How do informal structures impact on cooperation among organizations?**
 - to what extent do informal structures in DC organizations enable interorganizational cooperation?
 - how does organization-internal bureaucracy undermine cooperation?
 - how do trust and personal interactions affect the likelihood and success of cooperation initiatives?
 - how can the scope of cooperation be determined?
 - how do incentive structures within organizations affect interorganizational relationships and goals such as harmonization?