

Fabian Krause

# U.S. Emissions Trading and what it can teach us for a Post-Kyoto World



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## Table of abbreviations

AAU	Assigned Amount Unit
AB 32	California Assembly Bill 32
ACES	American Clean Energy and Security Act
ACMA	Alternative Compliance Market
APA	American Power Act
ARP	Acid Rain Program
ATU	Allotment Trading Unit
BAU	Business as Usual
C&C	Command and control
CAA	Clean Air Act
CAAPP	Clean Air Act Permit Program
CARB	California Air Resources Board
CBA	Cost Benefit Analysis
CCR	Cost Containment Reserve
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CDM EB	Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board
CER	Certified Emissions Reductions
CO <sub>2</sub>	Carbon dioxide
CO <sub>2</sub> e	Carbon Dioxide equivalents
COATS	RGGI CO <sub>2</sub> Allowance Tracking System
CoP	Conference of the Parties
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ERC	Emission Reduction Credits
ERG	Emission Reduction Generator
ERMS	Emissions Reduction Market System
EUR	Euro
EUTS	European Union Emissions Trading System
FESOP	Federally Enforceable State Operating Permit
GDP	gross domestic product
GGRF	California's Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund
GHG	Greenhouse Gases

*Table of abbreviations*

ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IEPA	Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
iNDC	Intended nationally determined contribution
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITMO	Internationally transferred mitigation outcomes
MGGRA	Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
MRR	Mandatory Reporting Requirements
MWe	Megawatt electrical
MWh	Megawatts per hour
NDC	Nationally determined contribution
NO <sub>x</sub>	Nitrogen Oxide
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSHA	U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PDD	Project Design Document
R&D	Research and development
RGGI	Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
RGGI MR	Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rules
SO <sub>2</sub>	Sulphur Dioxide
Source	Emissions source as covered by a program
U.S.	United States
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States Dollar
USD	United States Dollar
VOM	Volatile Organic Material
WCI	Western Climate Initiative