

Susann Lüdtke

The Secret of Lobbying in China

Who Influences Building Energy Efficiency Standards?



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Preface

As the airplane finally took off from Berlin to Shanghai in August 2013, the tension was overwhelming—up to then, not a single interview partner asked had firmly agreed to meet me. At this time, it was not certain if "The Secret of Lobbying in China" could ever be revealed. 270 days in China and years of listening and transcribing all the information collected later, this book shows how much the industry partakes in the development of standards in China's building energy efficiency (BEE) industry. This study's main goals are to assess the spheres of lobbying influence and determinants of successful group lobbying by analyzing four distinctive cases.

The findings of the detailed case study analysis will stimulate academic scientific debates and close research gaps, but can be also used to formulate recommendations for the industry on how to lobby successfully in China and for Chinese officials on how to cope with such an influence. This book reveals that firms should learn how to identify and appropriately communicate with political stakeholders. It also shows that political elites, who are responsible for technical and knowledge-intensive issues relating to BEE standardization in China, are increasingly reliant on the external advice of researchers, industry experts and others. Hence, while research results demonstrate that informal clientelist networks persist in China, there is evidence of so-called "scientization of politics". The lobby groups analyzed are able to transfer their expertise to the Chinese party state, which allows conclusions about the influence of business lobbying in China in similar knowledge-intensive sectors beyond BEE.

I designed my own research model to reliably measure lobbying influence and success by assessing the usefulness of lobbying targets, strategies and resources that were chosen by the industry. The research results are based on my extensive fieldwork in China between 2013 and 2015. More than 250 qualitative interviews and various forms of participatory observation were undertaken to understand the 'black box' of policymaking in China and find reasons for the influence and success of lobbying. Given the sensitivity of the research, the study errs on the side of caution by keeping all interviewees and information gained throughout the participatory observation anonymous. A codification system discloses only each interviewee's title, background, affiliation and the interview date. In especially sensitive instances, fictional acronyms were used for ease of reading.

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Field research in China can be incredibly fascinating and challenging at the same time. A large number of people supported me along my journey to reveal "The Secret of Lobbying in China", to whom I am particularly grateful.

This study is a slightly revised version of my dissertation "Lobbying Influence of Corporate Groups in China", which was accepted by the Julius-Maximilians University of Würzburg in 2017. My doctorate was financially supported by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom with funds from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. My gratitude extends further to a designated group of China scholars, who wisely counseled me during my journey. In particular, this applies to my doctoral supervisor Prof. Dr. Doris Fischer, who gave me enough freedom for research on a sensitive topic in China. She enriched this book with her kind heart, her critical spirit and her outstanding expertise on China. I also thank my second supervisor Prof. Dr. Björn Alpermann and Prof. Dr. Jörn-Carsten Gottwald for their valuable contributions and inspiring ideas.

I thank my parents and furthermore my grandfather Peter, who did not have the chance to see this book completed. I also thank my mother-in-law for carefully reading parts of the manuscript, and many other people who have always strengthened my critical mind and strived for new knowledge. No words can express my gratitude and love to my husband Dr. Christian Lüdtké. His intelligence, empathy, and support did not only have a great influence on me, but it helped me to refill my energy reserves every day and during hard times.

Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to all the protagonists in China, who did not only share their contacts with me but were willing to share their stories about lobbying influence in China. Their revealing information and thoughtfulness were used to challenge simple explanations and to consider the shades of gray and different arguments to solve the puzzle of "The Secret of Lobbying in China". Many of these interview partners encouraged me during my journey, which was a sign that my research was useful for them and will be for many others in the future. This book will increase the understanding of the Chinese power apparatus and governance structures. Not least in times of stormy seas, such knowledge is vital for both lobbying and doing business in China in general. This book would not

Acknowledgements

have such an empirical basis without these interview partners, to whom I would like to dedicate this book!

Susann Lüdtké, née Grune

Düsseldorf, March 2020

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Abbreviations

ACFIC	All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce
AHK	German Chamber of Commerce
AQSIQ	Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine
BEE	Building Energy Efficiency
BEE-S&T	Building Energy Efficiency and Science and Technology Department
CABEE	China Association of Building Energy Efficiency
CABR	China Academy of Building Research
CASBEE	Comprehensive Assessment System for Building Environmental Efficiency
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CGBC	China Green Building Council
CIBSDR	China Institute of Building Standard Design & Research
CNIS	China National Institute of Standardization
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CPBA	China Passive Building Alliance
CPCIF	China Petroleum & Chemical Industry Federation
CPUIA	China Polyurethane Industry Association
CSUS-GBC	Green Building Center of the China Society for Urban Studies
CSTC	Center of Science and Technology of Construction
dena	German Energy Agency (Deutsche Energie-Agentur)
DGNB	German Sustainable Building Council
DIN	Deutsches Institut für Normung
DM	Decision Maker
DV	Dependent Variable
ECP	Energy Cooperation Program
EPS	Expanded Polystyrol
ETICS	External Thermal Insulation Composite Systems
EU	European Union
EUCCC	European Union Chamber of Commerce in China
EQA	ETICS Quality Alliance
EV	External (Intervening) Variable

Abbreviations

FDI	Foreign-Direct Investment
FIE	Foreign-Invested Enterprises
FYP	Five-Year Plan
GBES	Green Building Evaluation Standard
GCCC	German Chamber of Commerce in China
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HSCW	Hot Summer Cold Winter
HSWW	Hot Summer Warm Winter
HVAC	Heating Ventilation Air-Conditioning
IBEE	Institute of Building Energy Efficiency
IBR	Institute for Building Research
IDV	Independent Variable
IV	Interview
LEED	Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
LSG	Leading Small Groups
MIIT	Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoHURD	Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development
MOST	Ministry of Science and Technology
MPS	Ministry of Public Security
MW	Mineral Wool
MNC	Multinational Company
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPC	National People’s Congress
PHA	Passive House Alliance
PHI	Passive House Institute
POE	Privately Owned Enterprises
PS	Preference Shaper
PU	Polyurethane
QA/CABEE	Quality Alliance of the China Association of Building Energy Efficiency
SAC	Standardization Administration of China
SASAC	State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
SEI	Strategic Emerging Industries
SFRI	Sichuan Fire Research Institute

Abbreviations

SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SOE	State-Owned Enterprises
SRIBS	Shanghai Research Institute of Building Science
SQD	Standard and Quota Department
TC	Technical Committee
TFRI	Tianjin Fire Research Institute
USGBC	United States Green Building Council
VP	Veto Player
XPS	Extruded Polystyrol

